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The engagement of reputable underwriter and auditor by the listing firm is believed 
to provide a positive signal to the market, thus reducing the uncertainty surrounding 
the firm's value. Since audit quality is differentiated, some of the issuing firms 
switch to more reputable auditors during listing to increase the credibility of the 
financial information in the prospectus. The disclosure of earnings forecast in the 
prospectus is also perceived to provide information that could reduce the 
uncertainty. However, evidence from previous studies on these issues is 
inconclusive. 
This study investigates the effect of underwriter reputation, auditor choice and 
auditor switch during listing and earning forecast error on the level of IPOs initial 
returns. Thus, the main objective is to examine whether these factors provide a 
signal to potential investors in IPOs that might have consequences on the level of 
initial return. This study also examines the relationship between the engagement of 
quality differentiated audit firms and level of earning forecast errors. 
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This study uses a sample of 1 00 KLSE Main Board IPOs and 1 00 KLSE Second 
Board IPOs for the period of 1 990-2000. It was found that Malaysian IPOs were 
significantly underpriced at 89. 1 9%. Findings on underwriters and auditors showed 
that most of the firms going public prefer to engage the services of reputable 
underwriters and Tier 1 auditors during listing. The evidence suggests that the initial 
returns of finns engaging reputable underwriters are higher compared to non­
reputable underwriters, however the difference is not statistically significant. 
The engagement of reputable audit finns was also found to have no significant effect 
on the initial returns of IPOs. Nonetheless, the management's decision to switch 
auditor during listing documented a significant positive relationship between auditor 
switch and IPOs' initial returns. Thus switching could be served as a signal for the 
firm's value. However the findings are inconsistent with theory. When the sample 
on auditor switch is classified into two sub-samples of different switch directions, it 
was found that there was no significant difference in the initial returns between firms 
with upward and lateral switch. 
For the sample firms, high negative forecast errors of 14.96% were observed. About 
59% of the lPOs' firms overforecasted their earnings. The fmding reveals no 
significant relationship between earning forecast errors and IPO initial returns. There 
was no significant relationship between reputable auditors and earning forecast 
errors. However listing board characteristics and economic conditions had a 
significant impact on the initial returns of IPOs. 
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PENGARUH JURUAUDIT SEMASA PENYENARAIAN KE ATAS 
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NORLIDA MAHUSSIN 
NOVEMBER 2003 
Pengerusi: Profesor Shamsher Mohamad Ramadili, Ph.D. 
Fakulti: Sekolah Siswazah Pengurusan 
Pengambilan penaja jarnin dan juruaudit yang mempunyai reputasi yang baik oleh 
firma yang akan disenaraikan dipercayai memberikan isyarat yang positif ke atas 
pasaran, seterusnya mengurangkan ketidaktentuan persekitaran nilai firma. Oleh 
kerana kualiti juruaudit dibezakan, sesetengah firma penerbit bertukar kepada 
juruaudit yang mempunyai reputasi yang lebih baik semasa penyenaraian bagi 
meningkatkan kredibiliti maklumat kewangan di dalam prospektus. Pendedahan 
ramalan perolehan di dalam prospektus juga dilihat sebagai imformasi yang boleh 
mengurangkan ketidaktentuan. Walaubagaimanapun, bukti dari kajian-kajian lepas 
dalam isu-isu ini adalah tidak konklusif. 
Kajian ini menyiasat kesan reputasi penaja jarnin, pemilihan dan pemukaran 
juruaudit semasa penyenaraian dan kesilapan ramalan perolehan ke atas pulangan 
awal saham terbitan awam. Oleh itu objektif utama adalah untuk mengkaji samada 
faktor-faktor ini memberikan isyarat kepada pelabur-pelabur yang berpotensi dalam 
terbitan awam yang mungkin memberikan kesan ke atas pulangan awal. Kajian ini 
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juga mengkaji perhubungan di antara kualiti juruaudit dan paras kesilapan ramal an 
perolehan. 
Kajian ini menggunakan sampel sebanyak 100 terbitan awam di Papan Utama dan 
100 terbitan awam di Papan Kedua Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur (BSKL) untuk 
tahun 1990-2000. Kajian menunjukkan saham-saham terbitan baru Malaysia 
ditawarkan secara signifikan di bawah paras harga sebenar sebanyak 89.19%. Kajian 
ke atas penaja jamin dan juruaudit menunjukkan kebayakkan firma yang akan 
disenaraikan cenderung menggunakan perkhidmatan penaja jamin yang mempunyai 
reputasi yang baik dan juruaudit Tier-1 semasa penyenaraian. Bukti menunjukkan 
bahawa pulangan awal firma-firma yang menggunakan perkhidmatan penaja jamin 
yang mempunyai reputasi yang baik adalah lebih tinggi berbanding penaja jamin 
yang mempunyai reputasi yang kurang. Walaubagaimanapun,perbezaan tersebut 
secara statistik tidaklah signifikan. 
Penggunaan juruaudit yang mempunyai reputasi yang baik juga didapati tidak 
memberikan kesan signifikan ke atas pulangan awal terbitan awam. Namun begitu, 
keputusan pihak pengurusan untuk menukar juruaudit semasa penyenaraian 
menunjukan perhubugan signifikan yang positif antara penukaran juruaudit dan 
pulangan awal terbitan saham. Oleh itu, penukaran juruaudit boleh dianggap sebagai 
isyarat nilai firma. Walaubagaimanapun, dapatan adalah tidak konsisten dengan 
teori. Apabila sampel juruaudit dikelaskan kepada dua arah penukaran yang berbeza, 
didapati tiada perbezaan yang signifikan dalam pulangan awal antara firma-firma 
penukaran keatas dan penukaran selari. 
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Bagi sampel finna, kesilapan ramalan perolehan negatif yang tinggi sebanyak 
14.96% diperhatikan. Lebih kurang 59% daripada firma terbitan awam terlebih 
ramal perolehan mereka. Kajian mendedahkan tidak wujud perhubungan signifikan 
antara kesilapan ramalan perolehan dan pulangan awal terbitan awam. Kajian juga 
mendapati tiada perhubungan yang signifikan di antara juruaudit yang mempunyai 
reputasi yang baik dan kesilapan ramalan perolehan. Namun begitu, ciri-ciri papan 
penyenaraian dan keadaan ekonomi memberikan kesan ke atas pulangan awal 
terbitan awam. 
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1.1  
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 .1 Introduction 
Initial Public Offering or IPO is a new issue of shares, which is the sale of ordinary 
shares for the first time by a closely held company. In Malaysia, IPO is used by most 
companies as a means to raise the much needed funds and to be listed on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange. IPO provides investors with opportunities either to 
purchase shares before they are publicly traded or to buy them in the open market 
when they do begin to trade. 
There has been voluminous of studies on IPOs conducted since 1 970s, due to 
underpricing phenomenon that has been persistently observed. A number of studies 
conducted both in developed and emerging markets show the existence of initial 
underpricing (Ibbotson, 1975; Aggrawal and Rivoli, 1990; Lee et a/., 1 996; 
Kyimyaz, 2000).1 Malaysian based studies on IPOs reported a large underpricing of 
166% during 1 978-1 983 (Dawson, 1987) and 1 35% for the period of 1 975-1 990 
(Shamsher et a/., 1 994).2 Due to such developments, Malaysian IPOs continuously 
receive overwhelming attention among academics, practitioners and researchers for 
a possible explanation for this phenomenon. 
I Ibbotson, Aggrawal and Rivoli studied US IPO, Lee et al. studied Singapore IPOs while Kimyaz 
studied Turkey IPOs. 
2 Compared to Singapore (39.4%) and Hong Kong ( 13.8%), Dawson found that Malaysia had the 
most extreme cases of underpricing. 
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Regulations in Malaysia do not pennit any documents of invitation to be released to 
investors before the application is approved. Public investors nonnally rely on the 
infonnation contained in the prospectus, an introductory document before the issue. 
The prospectus nonnally contains infonnation on the assets, historical profitability, 
economic prospects, investment plans, and earning and dividend forecasts of the 
issuing finn. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the finn's value, the management 
of the issuing finn nonnally tries to increase the credibility of the infonnation 
conveyed through agent reputation and by disclosing infonnation that can signal the 
finn's value. 
The reputational standings of a finn's underwriter and auditor are potential signaling 
devices that convey the credibility of the issue. An issuing finn that engages the 
services of a reputable underwriter and auditor during listing is hypothesised as a 
high value finn, therefore reducing the uncertainty of the value of the finn. The 
audited report on the finn's current financial status is an important element in a 
prospectus. The fact that finns often change auditors at the time they go public 
provide evidence to support this contention. Meanwhile, earning forecast provided 
in the prospectus is also being argued as a potential signal for a finn's value. The 
investors may tend to interpret the absence of a profit forecast in the prospectus of 
new issues as a bad signal. 
Financial theories suggest that the reputation of underwriter, auditor choice and 
auditor switch during listing, and earning forecast errors reflect on the level of initial 
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returns of IPOs. Empirical evidence on these factors provides inconclusive 
evidences, which in tum, provide opportunities for further research into the issues. 
1.2 Malaysian IPO Market and the Process of Listing 
The process of Initial Public Offering is currently regulated by the Securities 
Commission (SC), established in March 1993. Previously, the listing process was 
handled by the Capital Issue Committee (CIC), the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MIT I) and the Foreign Investment Committee (FIC). The SC has 
taken over these functions, thus reducing the time taken to obtain approval for 
listing. However, in some cases the application may also need to be submitted to 
MITI and FIC to obtain official clearance. 
There are two trading sections on the KLSE, the Main Board and the Second Board. 
Listing requirements on these two boards differ slightly, being less stringent for the 
Second Board. The Second Board was launched on November 1 988 to facilitate the 
raising of external capital by smaller companies with good growth potentials. As 
shown in Table 1 ,  up until December 2002, the total number of listed companies was 
846, of which 562 companies were listed on the Main Board and the remaining were 
listed on the Second Board. Due to the rapid economic growth during the 1990s, 
many Malaysian private companies went public. The years 1996 and 1 997 showed 
the highest number of new listings with 92 and 88 companies respectively. 
However, the Asian fmancial crisis, which started in mid-1997, resulted in a decline 
of the number of new listings. 
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Table 1.1 - Number of New Listing 
Number of New Listing 1992-2002 
Year Main Board Second Board Total 
2002 22 22 44 
2001 6 14 20 
2000 1 2  26 38 
1999 10  1 1  2 1  
1 998 6 22 30 
1997 25 63 88 
1996 40 52 92 
1995 1 8  33 5 1  
1994 1 9  47 66 
1993 12  32 44 
1992 25 20 45 
Source: KLSE Listing Statistic (2002) 
Besides the Main Board and Second Board, the MESDAQ market was created on 
March 1 8, 2002 following the merger of the Malaysian of Securities Dealing and 
Automated Quotation (MESDAQ) Berhad with the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE). It operates as a unique market with a separate identity from the KLSE Main 
Board and Second Board, capturing specifically the capital raising needs of 
technology and high-growth potential companies. Up until the end of December 
2002, the number of new listings in the MESDAQ market was seven. 
Once the decision on the amount of capital and types of shares to be raised are made 
and approved by the board of directors, a firm needs to hire an adviser, normally a 
merchant bank who acts as an underwriter for the issue. This is a statutory 
requirement directed by the Securities Commission. The underwriter will assist the 
company that goes public in pricing the offering, writing the prospectus and 
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marketing the stock. Currently, there are twelve merchant banks involved in the 
IPOs process as shown in Table 2. 
Table 1 .2 - Merchant Banks in Malaysia 
Name of Banks Year of Total assets at the 
Commencement of end of Financial Year 
Business in Malaysia 1998/99 
(RM Million) 
1 .  Amanah Merchant Bank Berhad 1975 1 ,890.4 
2. Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank 1976 14,823.2 
Berhad 
3. Aseambankers Malaysia Berhad 1973 3,724.5 
4. BSN Merchant Bank Berhad 1974 629.3 
(formerly known as Rakyat MB) 
5. Bumiputra Merchant Bankers 1972 1,806.3 
Berhad 
6. Commerce International Merchant 1974 3,478.8 
Bankers Berhad 
7. Malaysian International Merchant 1974 2,256.6 
Bankers Berhad 
8. Perwira Affin Merchant Bank 1970 3,849.0 
Berhad (formerly known as 
Permata MB) 
9.  Perdana Merchant Bankers Berhad 1975 653.6 
(formerly known as Intradagang 
MB) 
10. Sime Merchant Bankers Berhad 1973 858 . 1  
(formerly known as Asian Int. 
Merchant Bankers Berhad) 
1 1 . RHBSakura Merchant Bankers 1974 4,406.5 
Berhad (formerly known as D&C 
Sakura MB) 
12 .  Utama Merchant Bank Berhad 1975 1 ,440.5 
(formerly known as Utama 
Wardley Berhad} 
Source: The Central Bank and the Financial System in Malaysia 1989-1999, Bank 
Negara Malaysia (1999) 
Once the price of the issue is agreed on, the issuing firm through its adviser submits 
the application to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the 
Foreign Investment Committee (FIC) for approval. The approved application is then 
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submitted to the Securities Commission (SC) for examination and approval before 
the conclusion of the undetwriting agreement and the announcement of the offer 
pnce. 
Methods of underwriting in Malaysia are generally based on firm commitment. In an 
undetwriting agreement between the firm and the investment banker, the banker 
underwrites the entire issue of shares and then sells them to the general public. The 
underwriter bears all the risks in undetwriting the IPO. The underwriter's profit is 
from the difference between the cost of issuing the securities and the price of 
offering to public. This profit is known as the underwriting spread. Book building, 
which is practiced in some countries, is not allowed in Malaysia. Pre-market surveys 
whereby the underwriter can test the market or fine-tune the offer price, which are 
applicable in a developed market are also not allowed here. The offer price and the 
number of shares to be issued must be clearly stated in the prospectus and no 
changes can be made. The content and form of the prospectus should be according to 
the Companies Act 1 965 and KLSE Listing Requirements. Part 8. 1 3, Section 8.24 of 
the Listing Requirements states that the firm has to provide a profit estimate or profit 
forecast, the principal basis of the assumptions for the year subsequent to the 
registration date of the prospectus. It is noted that part II of the Fifth Schedule of the 
Companies Act specifies that the auditor gives an opinion on the compilation of the 
specific forecast and the accounting policies used. 
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Due to the potential risk it is exposed to in underwriting the IPO, the investment 
banker typically does not handle the purchase and distribution of issues by itself. It 
usually forms an underwriting syndicate by which a group of investment bankers 
underwrite the issue. The underwriting group appoints a managing underwriter or 
lead underwriter who also acts as the originating investment banker and prepares all 
the necessary registration documentation for the regulatory authorities, and to 
oversee the underwriting exercise to protect themselves from possible risks. 
Companies have different reasons for seeking a listing on the KLSE. The primary 
reason is to raise capital since it is considered as an efficient and cost effective way 
to raise funds for the expansion of business operations and as an alternative to 
borrowing. Some other reasons for getting listed are for obtaining a higher profile, 
increasing investors' confidence, and increasing potential to raise additional funds 
and recognition for expansion, as there is more publicity on their activities. 
1 .3 Methods of Listing 
A public company seeking listing of a quotation for its securities must be an ongoing 
concern or a successor of an ongoing concern. Normally, there are four methods of 
listing. The first is 'Public Issue', which is an offer to the public for subscription or 
purchase by, or on behalf of an issuer of its owns securities. The second method for 
listing is 'Offer for Sale'. 'Offer for Sale' is an offer for the public on behalf of the 
holder or allottees of securities that are already issued and subjected to be 
subscribed. 
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The third method that can be applied for listing is 'Placement'. 'Placement' refers to 
the obtaining of sUbscription for the sale of securities by an issuer primarily from or 
to person(s) selected or approved by the issuer. 'Placement' is normally made to 
dispose securities before the commencement of dealing in order to comply with the 
requirement that a minimum prescribed site of listed securities must be held by the 
pUblic. The fourth method for listing is called 'Tender' . A 'Tender' is an offer of a 
portion of the securities by way of tender, subject to a minimum price being 
described. 
When a company plans to be listed on the Exchange, the method of offering should 
consider the needs of capital for the company. Generally, a public issue of new 
securities is preferred, as it would benefit the company financially. 
1 .4 Listing Requirements 
For a company to apply for listing on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, there are 
some quantitative requirements that the applicants should fully comply with, which 
are as follows: 
1 .  Issued and Paid-up Capital 
• For listing on the Main Board - A minimum issued and paid-up capital ofRM60 
million, comprising of ordinary shares of not less than RM 1 .  00 each. 
• For listing on the Second Board - A minimum paid up capital ofRM40 million, 
comprising of ordinary shares of not less than RM1 .00 each. 
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2. Shareholding Spread 
For the Main Board and the Second Board, the shareholding spread requirements 
are the same. 
a. An applicant must have at least 25% of its issued and paid-up capital in the 
hands of a minimum number of public shareholders holding not less than 
1 ,000 shares each, which are as follows: 
Table 1.3 - Public Spread Before Amendments 
Minimum number of 
Nominal value of issued and paid-up capital shareholders 
RM40 million to less than RM60 million 750 
RM60 million to less than RMI00 million 1000 
RMIOO million and above 1250 
Source: Listing Requirement on KLSE Handbook (1997) 
b. The employees of an applicant, its subsidiaries and holding company are not 
excluded from the minimum number of public shareholders. 
c. An applicant must ensure that at least 500 shareholders, if its issued and 
paid-up capital is less than RM60 million, or at least 750 shareholders, if its 
issued and paid-Up capital is RM60 million or more, are public shareholders 
who are not employees ofthe applicant, its subsidiaries or holding company. 
